Volume I, Number 4; 15 November 12

Eurasia Analyst

Volume 1, Number 4                                                                                                                              15 November 12

Russian Gun-Running Comes to Light by Professor Stephen Blank

The Bases of Russian Foreign Policy, Part 2: Who? by Susan J. Cavan

Russian Gun-Running Comes to Light

by Professor Stephen Blank

Recently, Nigerian authorities detained a Russian ship carrying weapons, but Russian diplomats apparently persuaded them that the ship was not smuggling weapons. (1)   In other such cases,  however,  Russia was not so fortunate.    On October 10, Turkish authorities intercepted and forced the landing of a Syrian bound plane coming from Moscow and apparently carrying munitions.  Although Russian officials denied that the plane carried arms, Turkish authorities and the US government have stated otherwise. (2)  Moscow finally had to admit that it was carrying “radar gear.” (3)  This episode is not as unusual as the press it garnered would imply.  It obviously goes beyond the boundaries of ongoing Russian weapons sales to Syria — sales that Moscow has said would continue, as they are not illegal.  As counterpoint, Moscow now complains that the US is “coordinating” arms deliveries, particularly of Stinger anti-air missiles, to the Syrian rebels. (4)  The situation in Syria is not unique — Russia has fully and repeatedly incorporated gun-running to terrorist  movements and states into its strategy, often for reasons that essentially involve striking at the US, its interests, and its allies.

To be sure, other governments run guns to their clients.  It is the character of Moscow’s clients that set them apart.  Previous sales of Russian weapons to Syria often have been transferred, possibly with Russian foreknowledge, to Hamas and Hezbollah. These arms sales fortified the Irano-Syrian connection, which threatens Israel and US allies in the Gulf; it also benefitted Moscow by confirming Syrian and Iranian dependence upon Russian arms sales, a dependence that Moscow in turn uses to strengthen its role in the region.  By 2005, Syria already had 1000 Russian Kornet Anti-tank RPGs. Russia also sold a significant quantity of RPG-29 Vampirs with tandem HEAT (high explosive anti-tank) Pg-29V warheads, hundreds of Metis-M anti-tank missile systems and Sagger AT-3 and Spigot AT-4 anti-tank wire-guided missiles.  In 2005, Syria and Russia then signed a $70 million deal for 20 SA-18 Igla man-portable infrared homing SAMs leading Syria to commence discussions for Iskander-E-SS-21q and even S-300PMU long-range SAMs.  All these weapons plus the Spandrel-AT-5 anti-tank missile eventually ended up in the arsenals of Hezbollah and Hamas and then were used by them in 2006 and 2008-09.  For months, Moscow stridently denied transferring these weapons but certainly did nothing to enforce strict Syrian control over its weapons.  Many attribute Hezbollah’s performance in its 2006 war with Israel to Russian military advisors.  Thus, Moscow also uses Middle East wars as laboratories for its weapons. (5)

Iran

Russian arms sales to Iran are the most dangerous of all its arms sales due to Iran’s nuclear programs and global support for terrorism, as well as for “rogue states,” such as North Korea and Venezuela (e.g. Tehran’s support for Venezuela’s quest for domestic uranium).  Iran’s unstinting assistance to Hamas, Hezbollah, and terrorists in Latin America is also a matter of public record, as was Israel’s 2010 capture of a ship laden with Iranian weapons earmarked for Hezbollah.  Interestingly enough, the ammunition boxes found on board the ship displayed Spanish writing, suggesting another possible connection with Venezuela. (6)

Other reasons for concern pertain to non-nuclear related Russian arms exports through 2010.  Iran already has reached the point where it can appeal to China for defense exports (ironically, probably Russian knock-offs).  Thus, Iran raised hints that if it does not get the S-300 SAM for which it signed a contract with Russia in 2007, it might turn to China.  This would serve as another example of Russia’s reckless arms sales to China coming back to haunt it. (7)  Second, the 2009 incident of the Arctic Sea (a ship that left Russia and purportedly was hijacked by pirates in the Baltic Sea, then disappeared until the Russian Navy tracked it down in the Cape Verde Islands), illustrates that the cancer of corruption in the arms trade apparently has infected Russian arms sales to Iran.  More and more it appears that this ship was chartered to run Russian missile parts to Iran, indicating a chain of corruption throughout Russia’s arms sales and military industrial establishments.  Allegedly the Mossad discovered this sale and alerted Russian intelligence so as not to embarrass Russia. (8)  This situation embodies the dangerous link between Russia’s arms mafia and the government, including corrupt officials and middlemen.  As an Israeli columnist wrote then,  “In modern-day Russia, there really does exist a symbiosis between the state and the weapons mafia.  In this situation, the mafia does not always have to act in circumvention of the state machine to supply weapons to pariah states.  The mafia — and this might be the most important conclusion to be drawn from the story of the disappearance of the notorious freighter [Arctic Sea-author] – can be used as a weapon for state policy.  Clearly, the Russian government will not dare use official channels today to supply missile systems to Iran.  However, when it is the mafia illegally selling these systems, well, what can the government do, especially when it is certain that only lumber is being exported from the country?” (9)

Even more serious charges have surfaced in a report by the leftist forum.msk.ru newspaper, alleging that the Russian government, operating through the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye), led at the time by General Valentin Korabel’nikov, put together a decade-long  program of clandestine weapons sales to Iran to keep Israel and Washington guessing as to Iran’s true capabilities.  This gray and black market program reportedly also enlisted the cooperation of Algeria and Syria, the arms brokers Viktor Bout (currently serving 25 years in the US for arms smuggling) and Munzer al-Kassar (who was arrested in Spain in 2007 and extradited to the United States where he died in 2009), Russian organized crime figures in Spain, along with certain members of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) who have bases in Iran and engage regularly in arms trafficking.  In other words, Moscow apparently orchestrated a long-running program of illicit and clandestine arms sales to Iran, involving terrorists, criminals, and complicit governments until the network broke down with the arrests of the Kurdish contact Zakhar Kalashov (currently jailed in Spain after conviction on money laundering charges).  That initial arrest led to other arrests, Algeria’s return of Russian weapons (allegedly because they were defective), the sacking of General Korabel’nikov, the break up of the network with the arrests of the two arms brokers, and an abortive last attempt, using the Arctic Sea, to run weapons to Iran in 2009. (10)  If these reports are true they represent the depths of corruption to which the arms trade has brought the government in its linkages with organized crime and illustrate the dangers this trade poses to Moscow, as well as to international security more generally.

Since Iran then re-exports these weapons, including possibly Shahab-3 missiles to rogue states like Syria (among others), this amounts to playing with fire. (11) This urge to play with fire and also to be on both sides of the action in the Middle East is not new.  We saw it earlier in Iraq.  In the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Russia simultaneously sought partnership with Washington and friendship with Iraq.  It was prepared to “play ball” with the US as long as Washington acknowledged Russian interests in Iraq, and more broadly the Gulf, because its interests there were both economic and political in nature and because they served to enrich key political elites in Moscow.  The fact that working with Washington also validated Russia’s stance as a legitimate actor with respect to Iraq’s destiny provided an added bonus.  Russia’s interests in Iraq included large debts of $7-8 billion, large-scale energy contracts to develop Iraqi oil fields, and large-scale trade in Russian goods under the notoriously corrupt oil-for-food program that, as we now know, enriched many members of Russia’s elite.  In broader perspective, the Gulf States in general were, and are, regarded by Russia’s defense industry and the Ministry of Atomic Affairs (Minatom) as fertile hunting grounds for large profitable sales. (12)   Meanwhile, Russian intelligence was  furnishing Saddam Hussein with the results of Western conversations about Iraq and running weapons to Iraq, again indicating Moscow’s desire to keep a foot in both camps. (13)

For over a decade Moscow was a major provider of external support for Iran’s missile, air defense, space, and naval programs. (14)  In 1998, Yevgenia Albats outlined Russo-Iranian collaboration in helping Iran build nuclear missiles for use as a future IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missiles) that could target Israel and Turkey.  There is speculation that Iran also hopes to build an ICBM to target the United States and Europe.  Albats detailed the conscious participation and coordination of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), the State Commissions on Non-Proliferation, and on Science and Technology, Yevgeny Primakov’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and probably the Ministry of Defense in projects to send Russian scientists to Iran to transfer nuclear know-how as Iran aims to develop IRBM’s and then ICBMs. (15)  The large number of Russian scientific-technological institutions helping Iran develop its programs strongly suggests governmental involvement in coordinating this interaction, especially as many of them either had close connections with the government, or were under its authority, or claimed to have informed the government of what they were selling to Iran. (16)  Indeed, the Russian press publicly acknowledged that the Shahab-3 is built with the latest Russian technology.  (17)

Balkans and Latin America

There is a long, complicated history to Russian involvement in the Balkans.  Recently, it appears that a lucrative trade has emerged using the Balkans for transshipment of weapons.   Perhaps the most egregious example arises from the corruption of Montenegro by Russian money and criminal organizations (with possible links to the government), including the fact that since 2010, 39 suspicious flights have been recorded leaving Podgorica airport in Ilyushin 76 planes bound for Armenia’s Erebuni military airport apparently with arms intended for Nagorno-Karabakh, which has subsequently seen an increase in border incidents within the same time frame. (18)  The use of these Russian planes and the link to the long-standing, large-scale arms trafficking between Russia and Armenia immediately raises suspicions of Russian governmental involvement, if not orchestration of this program.  Whether or not it is criminal, it could not have come about without the collusion of Montenegrin officials at the airport, in the customs service, etc.

In Latin America, Moscow operates primarily through Venezuela, which has been a major provider of Russian weapons to the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) in Columbia. (19)  In 2008, it was clear that Russian policymakers such as Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, then Premier Putin’s right-hand man, apparently wanted to conduct a Latin American policy of destabilization, working against US interests regardless of the consequences.  Sechin reportedly promoted economic deals and arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua and the formation among them of an alliance as “Moscow considers the formation of such a union a worthy response to U.S. activity in the former Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic.” (20) Not surprisingly, Sechin advised Putin that Moscow should upgrade its relations with these countries, in particular, and Latin America in general. (21)

Deputy Prime Minister Sechin appears to have encouraged Hugo Chavez to develop a nuclear program, and Sechin negotiated the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to Venezuela. In July 2009, he also arranged a deal with Cuba that allowed Russia to conduct deep water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. (22)

Soon afterward the US Drug Enforcement Agency arrested Viktor Bout, the alleged international arms seller (who had enjoyed Moscow’s protection), in Bangkok during a sting in which Bout was lured into thinking he would be selling weapons to the FARC.  As many press reports have linked Bout to Igor Sechin and as it seems that the Russian government has been anxious to obtain his release, it is at least worth inquiring if Bout might have been part of Sechin’s plan for a Latin American, anti-US alliance and could, therefore, have compromised Russian policy.  (34) Whatever the answer, Moscow, despite its claims that its arms sales rules are the strictest in the world, has long since made it an act of high policy to sell weapons to thuggish characters as long as they work against US interests and allies. (24) Clearly, such arms sales are now, and for some time have been, an established component of Russia’s strategy.

By Professor Stephen Blank

Strategic Studies Institute

US Army War College

Not for citation or quotation without consent of the author

The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US Government.

Copyright © 2012 resides with individual authors.  All rights reserved.  Send requests for permission to EurasiaAnalyst@gmail.com

End Notes:

(1) “Russian Ship Not Involved in Arms Smuggling,”-MFA www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/129097, 24 October 12.

(2)  “Russia Demands Answers After Turkey Forces Down Syrian Plane,”  St. Petersburg Times, 11 October 12, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=36341; Moscow The Moscow Times Online, in English, October 22, 2012, Open source Center, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  Central Eurasia  (Henceforth,  FBIS SOV), 22 October 12.

(3)  “NHK – Russia Admits Syria Plane Carried Radar Parts,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C_a-GhKsJI, 13 October 12.

(4) Russia: U.S. Coordinates Weapon Deliveries to Syria Rebels,” Defensenews.com, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121025/DEFREG02/310250006/Russia-U-S-Coordinates-Weapon-Deliveries-Syria-Rebels, 25 October 12.

(5)  Alexander Nemets, “Moscow and the Middle East Wars,” Unpublished Manuscript.

(6)   Fernando Ariel Gimenez and Meir Javendanfar, “Is Iran Arming Venezuela,?” http://www/realclearworld.com/blog/2009/11/latin_american_destined_weapon.ht.

(7) “Russia ‘Losing To China On Iran S-300 Quest,’” PressTV, 9 May 09 via www.payvand.com/news/09/may/1109.html.

(8) “’Israel Link’ In Arctic Sea Case,” BBC, 9 September 09, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h/europe/8247273.htm.

(9) Vitaly Portnikov, “The Phantom Ship and a Living Mafia,” Tel Aviv,  Vesti-2 Supplement, in Russian, 10 September 09,  FBIS SOV, 10 September 09

(10) “Global Alternative: The Logical conclusion of a major Failure of Russian Intelligence,” Moscow, www.forum.msk.ru, in Russian, 9 November 09,  FBIS SOV, 9 November 09.

(11) Jerusalem, DEBKA-Net Weekly Internet Version, in English, July 21, 2006,  FBIS SOV, 21 July 06.

(12) Cohen, “Russia and the Axis of Evil: Money, Ambition, and U.S. Interests”; Eugene B. Rumer, “Russia’s Policies Toward the Axis of Evil: Money and Geopolitics in Iraq and Iran,” Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, 26 February 03, wwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/rume0226; Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian Interest in Trading With the “Axis of Evil”, Ibid., wwc.house.internatonal_Relations/108/wall/0226.

(13) David Harrison, “Revealed: Russia spied on Blair for Saddam,” The Daily Telegraph, 13 April 03, www.telegraph.co.uk.

(14)  Nemets and Trofino, pp. 367-382; Alexander Nemets and Robert W. Kurz, “The Iranian Space Program and Russian Assistance,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, XXII, NO. 1, 2009,  pp. 87-96.

(15) Moscow, Novaya gazeta Ponedelnik, in Russian, 16-22 March 98, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Arms Control, (Henceforth FBIS TAC) 98-076, 17 March 98.

(16) Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Long-Range Missile Capabilities,” REPORT of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, July 15, 1998 Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, pp. 198-199, David Fillipov, “What US Calls Arms Proliferation, Russia Firm Calls Business as Usual,” Boston Globe, 19 August 98, p. 1.

(17) Moscow, Izvestiya in Russian, 18 July 00, FBIS SOV, 18 July 00.

(18) Joshua Kucera, “The Art of the Arms Deal,” Eurasia Insight, 27 September 12, www.eurasianet.org; www.statebusiness.tumblr.com.

(19) “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of  ’Raúl Reyes’,” International Institute of  Strategic Studies, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/the-farc-files-venezuela-ecuador-and-the-secret-archive-of-raul-reyes/?locale=en, 2011.

(20) Open Source Center, Open Source Committee, OSC Analysis, “Hard-Liner Sechin Spearheads Aggressive Russian Foreign Policy,” FBIS SOV, 24 September 08.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Richard Sakwa, “Russia’s Grey Cardinal, Open Democracy, 15 June 11, www.opendemocracy.net/print/59978.

(23)  There are numerous press accounts of Viktor Bout’s background, arrest, conviction, and connections, including “Profile: Victor Bout,” BBC News, 5 April 12 via http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11036569; Disarming Viktor Bout,” by Nicholas Schmidle, the New Yorker, 5 Mar 12 via http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/05/120305fa_fact_schmidle.  For information on Russian requests for his return, see, among others “Russia officially requests US to hand over Bout,” rt.com, 23 August 12 via http://rt.com/politics/russia-bout-request-us-400/.

(24) Moscow, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, 18 October 12,  FBIS SOV 18 October 12.

~~~

The Bases of Russian Foreign Policy, Part 2:  Who?

By Susan J. Cavan

“The need for constant analysis and strategic planning regarding all security issues, as well as the drafting of presidential decisions, necessitates the existence of a special constitutional advisory body accountable to the President. This body is the Security Council.” (1)

In an interview with Rossiyskaya gazeta to mark the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Security Council, the Secretary of the Council, Nikolai Patrushev, provided insight into the range and import of the Council’s work, as well as its structure:  “[I]t is the Security Council that is responsible for drafting practically all conceptual doctrinal documents in our country. (…) The Security Council includes permanent members as well as members in an advisory capacity.  (…)  Strategically important subjects are brought up at Security Council sessions, and Security Council permanent members and members are invited to attend. Operational conferences involving only permanent members also are held for discussing current and future issues, usually on a weekly basis.” (2)

In its present iteration, the permanent members of the Security Council are the President (Chairman of the Council); Prime Minister; Directors of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); Ministers of Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs; the Speakers of the Federation Council and State Duma; the president’s Chief of Staff; and the Secretary of the Council.  Currently, Nikolai Patrushev, former Director of the FSB, is the Secretary of the Council.  Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of United Russia, also has been named a permanent SC member.

The membership of the Council represents the highest level of the security elite in Russia and many members share similar employment paths that have brought them together in earlier stages of their careers.  Half of the members, including, of course, President Putin, have strong links to former Soviet power organs, primarily the KGB.  Several members are linked to Putin through work in Leningrad/St. Petersburg and with the former mayor, Anatoli Sobchak.

There are permanent members who currently have primarily legislative remits, notably Valentina Matviyenko, Sergei Naryshkin, and Boris Gryzlov.  All three have connections to St. Petersburg.  As has been noted many times before, Vladimir Putin’s years working with Sobchak in the Leningrad City Executive offices seems to have been formative in many ways, not least in building close ties to trusted companions, whom Putin later brought to Moscow to work with him.   Of the twelve permanent SC members (other than Putin), seven have connections through Leningrad/St. Petersburg.

Most of the permanent members are of an age with Putin, raised during the stagnation of the Brezhnev era, but also seeped in the reform battles that followed.  (3)  Like Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri Andropov, as well as President Putin, several members have had explicit KGB careers, including Alexander Bortnikov, Sergei Ivanov, Rashid Nurgaliyev and Nikolai Patrushev.  The newest member, recently-appointed Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, along with Boris Gryzlov, distinguished themselves in supporting Putin in his early days as Yel’tsin’s anointed successor and have retained important roles either in the Kremlin, cabinet, or legislature in the years of Putin’s leadership.

The two members with specifically international portfolios, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Foreign Intelligence Director Mikhail Fradkov have ties with Russia’s foreign policy touchstone, Yevgeni Primakov.  (4)  Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, is also a graduate of the Soviet Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Foreign Ministry  and served in the 1990s as Ambassador to Malta, then Greece, during Primakov’s tenure as Foreign Minister.  Primakov  brought Matviyenko to Moscow to serve as deputy prime minister in his cabinet in 1998. (5)

Yevgeni Primakov clearly has been a strong influence on both Soviet and Russian foreign policy, although his influence has not been a constant force, but rather it has waxed and waned.   As was noted in Putin’s first term as president: “In the days after Sept. 11, Putin moved away from the so-called Primakov doctrine of “multipolarity” — advocating cooperation with India and China to balance the global reach of the United States — and toward the ostensibly pro -Western yet firmly pragmatic and often even hard-line views of his behind-the -scenes advisers.”  (6)  In the early stage of Putin’s presidency, the political battle between Putin’s supporters and the Primakov-Luzhkov Fatherland movement was still fresh, and Putin may have sought to distance himself from Primakov’s policies.  Before long, it appears Primakov’s “multipolarity” gained traction, and it doesn’t take much more than a cursory reading of Putin’s foreign policy formulation of February 2012 to realize that Primakov’s influence once again may be ascendant.

It would seem remiss not to note the connections on the Security Council to a figure who has maintained a Kremlin role for many years, through most of the Yel’tsin presidency, Putin’s first two terms, Medvedev’s interregnum, and Putin’s return.  Although not currently a member of the Security Council, Sergei Stepashin served Yel’tsin as Chief of the Federal Security Services, Head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, Justice Minister, Interior Minister, and acting Prime Minister (immediately before Putin).  In 2000, Putin appointed him head of the Control Directorate/Audit Chamber.  Stepashin also hails from St. Petersburg and became acquainted with several Council members there.  Although his early career was in the Interior Ministry, Stepashin returned to St. Petersburg after the attempted coup in 1991 as Head of the Leningrad City and Oblast’ Directorate for the Federal Security Agency.  It has been reported that early in Putin’s Presidency, Stepashin became interested in “turning the Auditing Commission into the most powerful financial secret service in the country.”   (7)  In his role as “financial watchdog,” which provides, in part, the ability to trace and identify sources of funding, Stepashin clearly exerts not inconsiderable influence on foreign and defense policy, as well as domestic issues. (8)

Dmitri Rogozin, Vice Premier with oversight of the defense and space industry, is not a member of the SC but nonetheless represents a possible wild card among Russia’s foreign policy elite.  Formerly Russia’s Ambassador to NATO and leader of the Rodina political party, Rogozin is an outspoken Russian nationalist, who has harshly criticized NATO expansion plans and staunchly defended Russian actions across the former Soviet Union.  Earlier this year, he explained his ideas on Russian foreign policy as the need to act with an “iron fist in a kid glove.”  (9)  While Rogozin’s views are forcefully expressed, it is unclear just how much weight they carry with President Putin.

Among the SC’s permanent members, clearly some are more influential on presidential decision making than others.  Sergei Ivanov enjoys a longstanding, close relationship with Putin, and seems long ago to have earned his trust.  The new Interior Minister, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, on the other hand, seems to have neither the trademark KGB experience nor the St. Petersburg connections.   He served most recently as Moscow Police Chief and his input on security matters may relate primarily to domestic affairs.

FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov is also head of the National Counterterrorism Committee’s (NAK’s) Federal Operational Staff.   The NAK has broad control of any large-scale antiterrorism operation.  When such an operation is launched, Bortnikov directs the work of the “chiefs or deputy chiefs of all the enforcement structures – 24 departments in all.” (10)  With such broad authority, it seems likely that Bortnikov holds significant sway, particularly in matters pertaining to terrorism.

There are, of course, other heavyweights among the Security Council’s permanent members, even among the advisory members.   The advisory members include regional representatives, such as the Mayor of Moscow, Governor of St. Petersburg, and presidential envoys to the regions, as well as the Chief of the General Staff, Head of the Border Guards, Finance Minister and Director of the Federal Narcotics Service.  In its current configuration, the Security Council provides President Putin with both broad ranging input and advice and the more pointed counsel available from a small group of trusted advisers.

By Susan J. Cavan

(sjcavan@bu.edu)

Copyright © 2012 resides with individual authors.  All rights reserved.  Send requests for permission to EurasiaAnalyst@gmail.com

End Notes:

(1) “About Security Council,” Official Kremlin website via http://eng.state.kremlin.ru/security_council/about_sec.

(2) “Russian security supremo interviewed on council’s agenda, national concept,” Interview with RF Security Council Secretary Nikolay Platonovich Patrushev by Rossiyskaya Gazeta Correspondent Ivan Yegorov.  Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 May 12 via LexisNexis Academic.  Also, see “Putin’s Militocracy,” by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, Post-Soviet Affairs, 2003, 19, 4, pp. 289-306 for a discussion of Security Council structure.

(3) For more on the legacy of post-Brezhnev reform, see “Brezhnev’s Children,” by Brian Whitmore.  The Power Vertical blog, 8 November 12 via http://www.rferl.org/content/brezhnevs-children/24765431.html.

(4) Mikhail Fradkov is often described as a “technocrat,” who landed the post of prime minister, and then FIS Director as either a compromise or for his loyalty and  pliancy — This despite his history in the USSR Embassy in India and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.  In his book, Minnoye polye politiki, Evgenii Primakov notes in a caption under a picture of himself with Fradkov that he has been acquainted with him for a long time.  Perhaps Fradkov’s technical work abroad fell under the jurisdiction of the Soviet power organs.  In any event, Fradkov clearly has long ties with Primakov.  For more on this subject, see “Fradkov: Silovik or Liberal,” by Olga Kryshtanovskaya.  Moscow News, 10 March 04 via LexisNexis Academic.

(5) “’Auntie Valya’ Awaiting Orders,” by Kevin O’Flynn.  The Moscow Times, 9 November 07 via LexisNexis Academic.

(6) “Putin’s Foreign Policy a Private Affair,” by Gregory Feifer.  The Moscow Times, 2 April 2002 via LexisNexis Academic.

(7) “Winter Hunt,” by Konstantin Smirnov. Kommersant-Vlast, No. 48, December 2001, pp. 20 – 21, What the Papers Say, 6 Dec 01 via LexisNexis Academic.  For biographical background of Sergei Stepashin, see http://persona.rin.ru/eng/view/f/0/10571/sergey-v-stepashin or his official biography on the RF Accounts Chamber website at http://www.ach.gov.ru/en/about/chairman/.

(8) On Stepashin as “financial watchdog,” see, for example: “Russia’s defense spending gradually taking off,” By Oleg Vladykin.  The Moscow News, 9 June 06 via LexisNexis Academic.

(9) “Russia should pursue “Iron fist in kid glove” foreign policy – Rogozin,” 26 February 12 RIA-Novosti via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120226/171539262.html.  It is noteworthy that Rogozin’s statement came one day before the publication of Putin’s foreign policy tract.

(10) “Serious Consequences from Trivial Arguments. Speculation About Military Operation in Dagestan Acquires Real Features” by Milrad Fatullayev.  Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 September 12; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via LexisNexis Academic.

~~~

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>
*
*